Summary
Once a space reaches a membership of more than around ten people, it becomes impractical to maintain access via keys and duplication. The cost is prohibitive and the security it provides decreases with each and every duplicate set you have cut.
Access control enables your members to gain access to your space without the need for a set of keys and enables revocation of expired members access without the need to get keys back from that member.
Don't get carried away with your security concerns on the electronics and network side when considering physical access control.
Locks of any kind will only protect you against honest people, most things don't stand up well when hit with a large hammer or a determined individual.
Core components:
- Access tokens
- Readers
- Ironmongery
- Controller
Access Tokens
Cards or tokens for access can come in many different types of technology, we'll cover a few here for reference.
Magnetic stripe
Whilst mostly obsolete, magnetic track card readers are still fairly common in many places with all UK bank cards still having this facility.
Unless you manage to obtain a low cost or free supply of readers and cards, it's not worth investing in this technology at this point.
If you do choose this technology you will need to program your own cards as using bank cards will reveal more information to the reader than you want to see. Limit your card numbers to 12 digits if you hope to have any compatibility with commercial off the shelf solutions.
Due to the contact based nature, the card and reader will wear out and require replacement.
Despite all of this, they are still commonly found in hotels worldwide.
See also:
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnetic_stripe_card
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiegand_interface
Contactless Tags
Contactless tags generally come in two frequencies:
- 125KHz
- 13.56MHz
See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio-frequency_identification
Most contactless tags are available in multiple formats such as cards, keyfobs or even stickers.
The main difference between the two main frequency standards is that of range and amount of data.
The 125KHz tokens are generally longer range but only transmit a serial number.
The 13.56MHz tokens are much shorter range (typically 10cm or less) but can perform much more complex operations including levels of encryption and security beyond those available at the lower frequency.
MiFare Classic / MiFare Classic EV1
MiFare is one of the defacto 13.56MHz contactless smart tag standards and is widely adopted. You may be familiar with it in one of the following:
- Oyster card
- Contactless bank payment cards
- University library or ID cards
MiFare tags are a sector and block based storage solution with many capabilities.
- Overview - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIFARE
- NXP index - http://www.nxp.com/products/identification-and-security/mifare-ics:MC_53422?fsrch=1&sr=1&pageNum=1
- MiFare Classic - http://www.nxp.com/products/identification-and-security/mifare-ics/mifare-classic:MC_41863
When using a MiFare tag for access control, there are primarily two techniques:
- Serial number
- Sector data
These will be discussed in more detail.
Tag Structure
For the purposes of this documentation we will be focusing on 1KB MiFare Classic tags but they are also available in 4KB.
Tags are organised into 16 sectors of 4 x 16 byte blocks, see Fig 5. from the spec:
Of these 4 blocks per sector, 3 can contain data and 1 contains the sector trailer. Sector 0, the first sector on the tag is special in that it can only contain 2 blocks of data with the first reserved for the manufacturer data.
Examining the manufacturer data we see:
Serial number
The Unique ID or tag serial number on MiFare Classic tags is 7 bytes of data. This is usually encountered as a 14 digit hexidecimal number that looks something like this:
AE B3 D6 E5 ED DD 6D
This 7 byte Unique ID is programmed at manufacture time and is used to identify the tag to the reader in order for operations to be performed against it. Mainly this number exists to provide an anti collision and selection mechanism when reading one tag amongst many presented to a reader.
Newer MiFare Classic EV1 tags can be programmed to return a 4 byte Non-Unique ID which can even be random instead of the usual 7 bit Unique ID. It's noted in the product data sheet that if you're programming your own tags you should set this option specifically to prevent it from being maliciously changed (you're looking for UIDFn or Unique ID Fuctionality number).
We're assuming that you are implementing UIDF0:
UIDF0: anti-collision and selection with the double size UID according to ISO/IEC 14443-3
Other options will probably not provide you with a consistent Unique ID that you'll be happy to use for access control.
Whilst widely used for access control, the Unique ID is easily cloned and not a massively secure mechanism for controlling access. On the other hand, you may wish to use this to your advantage by allowing members to clone their tag and gain access with an NFC application on their phone.
Pros:
- Easily cloned to mobile phone for access
- Simple to implement
- Most if not all readers stating MiFare support will work
- Use a members existing tag as access token (Oyster, Bank card or whatever)
Cons:
- Easily read and cloned with basic technology
- Susceptible to replay attacks
- Security through obscurity
As previously mentioned, there are easier ways to gain access than by obtaining a tag in order to clone it to gain access. Balance your paranoia with a practicality and decide for yourself if you consider this to be an acceptable risk.
Sector Data
Sector 0 access is authenticated however it's standard for this to be accessed using one of the default public keys. Regardless of this the Unique ID is always readable because it's primary use is as a selector when multiple tags are presented to the reader.
As has been mentioned, each sector of the tag has 3 x blocks of storage (with the exception of sector 0 which only has 2) so it's possible to put our own uniquely generated identifier into one of these blocks which we then have to authenticate against in order to retrieve.
The simple approach is to choose a tag sector and write our data to one of the blocks, then change the keys on that block in order to prevent unauthorised access or modification. Now in order to identify our member, we read the block of data from our reserved sector.
The authentication and encryption mechanisms that make this work were proved to be insecure and at Chaos Communications Congress in December 2007 (24C3) Karsten Nohl and Henryk Plötz gave a talk about this:
https://events.ccc.de/congress/2007/Fahrplan/events/2378.en.html
Phillips NXP subsequently withdrew the vanilla MiFare Classic tag replacing it with the MiFare Classic EV1 and MiFare Plus tags which addressed the security issues identified at the time. Whilst MiFare Classic EV1 is a drop in replacement with no changes required to existing infrastructure, MiFare Plus is a new standard requiring changes to support. Subsequently a side channel attack has been identified to exploit the MiFare Classic EV1 and DESFire EV cards which is less practical and potentially costly to reproduce.
See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIFARE#Security_of_MIFARE_Classic.2C_MIFARE_DESFire_and_MIFARE_Ultralight
Both the MiFare Classic and MiFare Classic EV1 cards use 48 bit keys for sector authentication so even without an exploit it's possible to brute force the key(s) given enough time.
Pros:
- Marginally more secure than using just the tag Unique ID
- Provides entertaining challenge for members
- We determine the number rather than having to use the manufacturer Unique ID
Cons:
- More complexity to deal with
- Not massively more secure than Unique ID
- Requires reader support
- Can't re-use an existing tag (like Oyster or bank) as we need to modify it
Whilst using sector data provides marginally more security, realistically there is probably few benefits to utilising it above Unique ID. both are clonable with more or less effort so it depends how much obscurity you wish to provide in your security. A sledge hammer is still a more likely means of attack than a card clone.
MiFare Application Directory
If we are to use sector data, it's wise to consider if you may want to use more than one sector of your tag for other applications. If this is the case, then MiFare Application Directory is worth investigating.
Instead of going directly to your programmed sector, we use the application directory to look up our application ID and then that determines which sector your data is held in.
There is substantially more work to support this model, however it enables a multi-use card that could potentially be shared with other organisations or groups. It is unlikely that it is worth the additional effort required to support this but it is included here for interest.
See also http://www.nxp.com/documents/application_note/AN10787.pdf
Other technologies
The following technologies are also available but were not discussed:
- Contact based smart cards
- Barcode or QR code
Generally these would not be considered suitable for controlling access.
Readers
See the section titled 'UK Disability Discrimination Act' below for discussion of reader height placements.
Seeed Studio RDM880
- https://www.seeedstudio.com/13.56Mhz-RFID-module-IOS(IEC)-14443-type-a-p-196.html
Supports unique ID or sector data. Available from Cool Components in the UK:
- https://www.coolcomponents.co.uk/rfid-reader-writer-13-56mhz.html
NXP PN532
Available with a breakout board from Adafruit:
- https://www.adafruit.com/products/364
Also available from ebay in various forms if you search for PN532.
Ironmongery
There are as many locking options as there are types of door for them to installed upon, so whilst it's possible to give general advice every door and circumstance is different.
When looking at locking hardware, the first piece of information one must consider is the mode in which they fail.
Fail Open (FO)
Fail Open or Fail Safe locks as implied fail in a manner that leaves the door insecure. This type of lock should not be used on an external door unless suitable battery backup is provided to retain security in the event of a power outage.
The lock is released by interrupting power supplied to the lock. A Break Glass Unit must be installed to permit the door to open regardless of the status of the controller. It is adviseable to monitor actuation of the Break Glass Unit to prevent it being activated and the door being left in an insecure state for an unknown period of time.
Consideration should also be given to if the door should open on sounding of a fire alarm. Whilst it may seem obvious that doors on the path of a fire escape route should automatically open on sounding, there are occasions when this is not entirely clear and advice should be sought from your local fire service. Consultation with the fire services college does not guarantee compliance with your local fire service. If in doubt, consult with your local fire service before performing installation work.
As an external door would likely be a fire exit, the likelihood of the fire service requiring it to fail open when the fire alarm is sounding is another reason to consider this an unsuitable locking mechanism for an external door.
Fail Secure (FS)
Fail secure locks result in the door being left in a secure, closed state.
The lock is released by applying power to the locking mechanism. This type of lock is normally an electronic enablement to a traditional locking mechanism such as an electronic strike plate.
Due to the way in which this is a mechanical enablement to a traditional locking mechanism, there are fewer considerations to interconnection with fire alarms though as with fail open locks, it is wise to consult your local fire service should you be in any doubt of the safety requirements.
Fail secure locks are recommended.
Recommended Locking Hardware
Whilst many locking mechanisms exist, the following come recommended depending on the specific circumstances.
Abloy EL560
See http://tinyurl.com/z47cumu
This lock is extremely expensive and requires installation by a suitably skilled locksmith. It is a traditional lock in all appearances but does not work in a traditional manner.
The handles on either side of the door operate independently with an electronic enablement.
It can be configured to operate Fail Secure or Fail Open, it can also be configured to operate opening inwards or outwards.
Cisa
- 11610 - http://www.saundersonsecurity.co.uk/cisa-11610-electric-lock.html
- 1A721 - http://www.saundersonsecurity.co.uk/cisa-elettrika-1a721-elec-lock-for-metal.html
These locks are fail secure and are released by application of 12v AC.
Whilst the Cisa locks offer a great value and level of security they are very specifically handed and direction focused. You need to know which direction your door opens (inwards or outwards) and if it is hinged on the left or right. See this handy diagram:
``` +--------+ +--------+ | 1 | | 2 | | \ | | / | +--- ---+ +--- ---+
+--------+ +--------+ | 3 | | 4 | | | | | +--- ---+ +--- ---+ / \ ```
- Right hand inward opening
- Left hand inward opening
- Right hand outward opening
- Left hand outward opening
Make sure that you purchase the correct handing and direction when ordering as it cannot be changed.
This is the lock of choice for London and Manchester Hackspaces.
Effeff Electric Strike
Available in fail open or fail secure flavours and for different voltages.
One of the main considerations when using this type of release is the lock that it is paired with.
Suggested lock: Imperial Locks G7088
This is an oval cylinder lock and may not be suitable for your circumstances. The main considerations should be:
Provision of an override lock should the system fail.
It should have an anti thrust bolt to prevent it being pushed back by inserting something between the door and frame. Distance between main latch and anti thrust bolt should be checked to ensure that the anti thrust component falls outside the gap created for the latch.
Controller
The specifics of the controller are beyond the scope of this document. Each and every space so far consulted has implemented their own solution with a combination of many different technologies. See the case studies below for information on what other spaces have done.
If you are implementing a fail open mechanism, you may wish to consider a battery backup solution to support the lock during power outages or your space will become insecure the moment the power drops. There are many camera power supply units on ebay that provide a metal box, voltages and battery backup capabilities if you want to source something off the shelf.
Local caching of data
The one recommendation to make is to ensure that your controller caches access data and logging information locally. Do not rely on the network being available to be able to open the door.
This could be through the use of a local copy of your access data in a text, CSV or SQLite database. Regardless, cache locally or you will be left standing at the door because an external service is down. This is most vexing and should be avoided.
Other considerations
UK Disability Discrimination Act
UK law states that every effort should be made to make facilities accessible for an individual with an impairment. There are limits to the practicalities of this, however as a principle we should also adhere to this.
According to the guidance in BS8300 6.6.1, 6.6.2, and 6.6.3:
"Door entry systems and entry phones should be positioned so as to be accessible to wheelchair users; the activation pad of an entry system should be on the latch side of the door within 200mm of the frame and be between 900mm and 1050mm from the floor"
"Digital locks should have a lever handle and be positioned between 900mm and 1050 from the floor."
"Keypads positioned to be convenient for wheelchair users may be awkward for tall people and vice-versa; consequently, consideration should be given to alternatives such as swipe cards or proximity readers."
Snippets above taken from:
http://www.relcross.co.uk/uploads/Best%20Practice%20Guides/1019-Approved-Doc-M-guidance.pdf
Light switches should be installed at a maximum height of 1200mm from the floor in accordance with BS7671 to the top of the fitting so it would not be unreasonable to install a reader at this height if no interaction beyond presentation of a tag is required as mentioned above.
It's also worth drawing attention to placement of readers on the opening edge of the door and not at the hinge side. Placing the reader at the hinge side makes an outward opening door incredibly difficult to open for a wheelchair user who must present a tag and then move out of the way to open the door.
The same advice should be followed for break glass units and request to exit switches.
Everyone is individual so tactfully engage your members who may have physical issues with the introduction of access control and ask for their input. Do this in the planning stages so that you can try to include adjustments as might be needed to support your members.
Override mechanisms
Make sure you don't skip fitting an override mechanism and know who has the keys in the event you need them! Having to break in to your space because your Raspberry Pi based controller crashed is not good.
If your locking mechanism is of a fail secure mechanical nature, then chances are it provides for an override key. Know who has the keys if you need them and don't leave them all in the space...
If you are using a fail open locking mechanism such as a maglock or frame based solenoid, you will need to provide yourself an override keyswitch in a discrete external location that will allow you to isolate and disable the lock should your controller fail. This does also add an attack vector for unauthorised access so consider that when choosing your placement.
Two factor authentication
Outside of your usual open evenings and days, the point of implementing access control is to allow members to gain access at any time of the day or night.
Your access token is something you have, however it can be lost or even stolen meaning that unauthorised access can be gained. Classically good security is made up of both something you have and something you know such as a bank card and PIN.
It's possible to implement two factor authentication that would require members to both present a card and then require a PIN matched to that card to be entered in order to gain access. This is not without issues however.
Adding PIN could cause issues for dyslexics and those with a visual impairment.
One suggested approach is to combine your requirement for two factor authentication with presence sensors that detect when your space is occupied. If there are people in the space, then only require presentation of a tag.
Should you decide to implement this, pay due regards to the height of your keypad in line with the recommendations in the section titled 'UK Disability Discrimination Act' in terms of placement and height.
UK Regulations, Best Practice and Legal Aspects
The Guild of Architectural Ironmongers and the Door and Hardware Federation got together to create the following best practice guide for fire and escape doors:
http://firecode.org.uk/Code_of_Practice_hardware_for_fire_and_escape_doors.pdf
This document mentions a number of standards that you may need to be aware of.
There are a large number of rules governing many aspects of the installation of access control systems. If you are in any doubt about what you're doing, the legality of your implementation or any other aspect of changes to a door that is considered a fire escape route, seek professional advice.
Whilst not consistent and often subjective, your local fire service may be able to give you advice and tell you what you need to know.
Disclaimer: This guidance document is not a substitute for professional advice for your specific circumstance or setup. Use some common sense.